The Airline Security Boondoggle

My Basic Argument

[For more cartoons by Larry Wright and others, click HERE.
You'll have to scroll down to find Wright's cartoons.]

Try a FREE ONLINE SHOCKWAVE AIRPORT SECURITY GAME. It's a lousy joke, as is airport security.

Argument "A": Support for Premise One

[The definitions I provide for key terms, such as "repressive," are my definitions, stipulations I make for purposes of these arguments. I have tried to avoid making them question-begging, having no wish to try to settle a dispute by definition. I shall resist becoming bogged down in a neo-scholastic consideration of meanings. That is an avoidance behavior, in my judgment. Moral language is not all that mysterious as used in ordinary discourse. I do want to avoid confusing micro-morality with macro-morality [my terms]. Just as one ought not get all in a dither when trying to predict when water will boil (a macro event), because one can not predict just how the sub-atomic particles of which the water is composed will move (micro events), so one should not feel pressed into nihilism because one can not get exactly clear about the descriptive and emotive characteristics and truth conditions of moral claims. Apologies for this digression.]

Support for Premises in Argument "A"

Support for Premise 1^a

I employ both "supposed to" and "actually does" because I want to cover cases, such as airline security measures, which are supposed to benefit, but in practice bring little, if any benefit to anyone, even the privileged socio-economically. That is made apparent, I believe, in the support I offer for Premise Two of my basic argument: evidence that air travel security measures are quite ineffective.

The argument might be stronger without the "elitism" premise. If you prefer, just drop it. I admit to be using "elitism" in a pejorative sense -- people who expect special treatment simply because of their positions in the socio-politico-economic scheme of things, positions often unearned and, frankly, undeserved. Positions often held due to heredity and/or sycophancy and/or fortune.

Narrowing the use of "benefit" to government-funded benefits would strengthen the premise, given the fact that all residents contribute passively or actively to the government kitty (Yes, they do. That is why "taxpayer" arguments are generally vacuous political grandstanding.). How does one deny people who have contributed financially or those through no fault of their own unable to make a net contribution financially to government-funded activities, the opportunity to avail themselves of those activites relevant to their welfare (especially to their safety), at least to some degree? For example, how does one defend providing a comprehensive health insurance package for members of Congress while denying health insurance to millions of Americans often in more dire need of health care than a congressperson?

Using the health care example, one might argue that benefits for the elite should not be stopped -- they should be extended to some extent to the unwashed masses. And I am arguing that the add-on security since 9/11 should be stopped. In the case of air travel security, the "security" is an illusion. Nothing much would be gained by providing a very expensive illusion for more people. There probably is something to gain from implementing more security for bus and train passengers. Presently, there is for all practical purposes none -- except perhaps for a few locations frequented by the elite (Washington, D.C., for instance). That would not mean, however, using measures added since 9/11 that have proved to be ineffective, repressive, and counterproductive.

Support for Premise 3^a

In the case of airline security, one might argue, among other things, (I hope facetiously) that even though quite ineffective, they at least provide employment for thousands. I would suggest, if employment is what one wants, that most airline security personnel be reassigned to work for Habitat for Humanity or some other organization that provides incentives and goods for those in need.

Explanation of Conclusion^a

Perhaps I should have used "and/or's" in the conclusion (Premise 1), so that failing one test would not eviscerate the entire argument. On the other hand, if all the claims implicit in the Conclusion (Premise 1 of the basic argument) hold up upon examination, the conclusion becomes all that much more forceful. As for support for each of the moral premises (Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7) in this argument (A), I offer none at this point. My position is that those premises are compatible with a disparate group of moral viewpoints. Additionally, I would argue that anyone who holds that any of the premises in question is false, probably lacks one or more basic characteristics required for making moral judgments, e.g., relevant knowledge or empathy. This is not intended as an ad hominem. Relevant knowledge and empathy are what people very often lack when attempting moral judgments. Also, there are persons who are amoral, who simply do not have the skills or the inclination to reason morally. They are rare. Were they not rare, I find it hard to understand how, if it is indeed conceivable, humans would have been able to populate the earth as they have. Morality seems to me quite adaptive in an evolutionary sense. But that is a story for another day.

Argument "B": Support for Premise Two

Support for Premises in Argument "B"

Support for Premise 2^b

The relative budgetary allocations to airline and surface transporation for security purposes have remained about the same since 9/11.^1,2 Of course surface transportation poses much more of a challenge when it comes to establishing security that is effective, but that does not mean much more can not be done. Bus and train marshalls and portable devices for checking passengers and luggage could be used, as examples. The reality is that the wealthy and the powerful generally travel by air and Amtrak is hardly the favorite of many congresspersons (being a government subsidized system).

Unfortunately, the reality also is that buses and trains are frequently the objects of sabotage.³ In a three year period, 1997 to 2000, there were 195 terrorist attacks on public transit systems worldwide.⁴ And more recently there have been attacks on surface transport in Spain and England. My personal experience during a couple dozen trips via bus and train since 9/11 is that sabotaging either would be very, very easy. I seldom see any sign of security measures, and those I have seen can easily be circumvented. People on buses and trains simply do not count as much as people on planes.

1. Budget of the United States Goverment, FY 2008, Department of Homeland Security. Office of Management and Budget <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/homeland.html>.
2. Budget of the United States Goverment, FY 2008, Appendix, Department of Homeland Security. Office of Management and Budget <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/dhs.pdf>.
3. Rail Transportation Ideal Terrorist Target. Santa Clara County Democratic Party citing Time 22 Mar. 2004. <http://sccdp.org/talkingpoints/TransitSecurity.pdf>.
4. Tucson Citizen 3 Apr. 2004, B1.
   
   

Support for Premise 4^b

The evidence is simply overwhelming. Airport security does not exist. The baggage screening system functioned so poorly that the British rejected it.¹ Most cargo entering the country by ship and most cargo loaded on planes is uninspected.¹⁸ Private planes take-off and land by the millions with minimal screening. The borders with Mexico and Canada are sieves, easy entry points for shoulder-mounted ground-to-air missles.² The Government Accountability Office estimates that "21,000 people who should not have been allowed to enter the U.S. came through official border crossing points between Oct. 1, 2005 and Sept. 30, 2006."¹⁵ In a widely publicized case in 2007 border agents did not even apprehend a man carrying a serious communicable disease when they were forewarned and actually identified the subject as he waited to cross the border.⁵

You probably have your own personal anecdotal examples of security checkpoints missing obvious items. I have passed through with a long nail file that set off an alarm, and my wife and I each had undiscovered several unisolated large liquid containers in our carry-on bags. Of course, there are more striking cases: the Denver woman who claims she passed through security checkpoints six times with a powerful Taser, the airline pilots who gained access to a restricted area with concealed weapons and incorrect ID's, the security testing agent who passed through with an IED taped to her leg even though alarms were sounded, the four-foot sword carried on by a passenger boarding at Dallas-Fort Worth, the college student who planted pseudo-explosives in the bathroom of an airliner and finally called the airline to tell them because the "explosives" had gone so long undiscovered, and so on and so on and so on.^6,7,8,13,14 To the anecdotal cases add the thousands of missing computers with security information on them and the hundreds of missing ID's and the missing uniforms and the airport workers who pass into secure areas unchecked.^2,3,4 And it gets worse.¹⁶

Over 400 airports are systematically tested by TSA (Transportation Safety Administration) investigators or agents of the GAO (Government Accountability Office) annually. To the best of my knowledge, the checkers fail to find weapons and pseudo-explosives anywhere from 10 percent to 100 percent of the time.^9,10 I use "to the best of my knowledge" because until 2003 the GAO published the results of its investigations, but then the results were suddenly no longer published--for security purposes no doubt! Nevertheless, investigations by several news organizations and admissions on the part of TSA and GAO make it clear that the effectiveness of security checkpoints has, if anything, worsened. Are you ready for this?? In 2006 agents smuggled weapons and pseudo-explosives by screeners at the Newark airport 20 out of 22 times!⁸ In the spring of 2006 GAO agents succeeded every time (21 out of 21) fooling screeners at one airport. In March of 2007 at the Denver International Airport screeners in the baggage area missed a book bomb and investigators successfully smuggled simulated weapons by checkpoints 90 percent of the time, according to a local media outlet. That is not unusual. The GAO reports that in 2006 90 percent of simulated explosives and guns were missed by screeners at 15 airports.⁶ In 2007 the GAO has reported that airport security checkpoints failed to detect liquid explosives in carry-ons or hidden on the person of investigators.¹⁹

There is absolutely no reason why the 9/11 hijackers could not have been stopped with existing security systems, had those systems been used effectively. Within the Federal Aviation Administration it was well known that security measures at airports could be breached with ease, but nothing was done about it.¹¹ Nine of the nineteen 9/11 culprits were stopped at security checkpoints. They set off alarms or had their bags searched even though no alarms were sounded. Tragically, the State Department was not sharing with airport security officials its list of thousands of persons suspected of being potential terrorists or of aiding terrorists. The names of two of the saboteurs were on the list.¹² Their plans could have been foiled by alert, well-trained screeners with access to a list of suspicious characters. Sharing information probably has done more to improve security in the air than any other single measure.

[The airlines, unfortunately, have managed to turn shared information into a further and unnecessary encroachment upon the civil rights of passengers. They have been chided by the TSA for lying to some passengers whom they choose to search by telling them they are on watch lists when they are not. The airlines counter that they have not been provided clear guidance, and it is the government's responsibility to check passengers against watch lists. Overkill and confusion once again.²¹]

Strenghtening cockpit doors, making the pilots and controls less accessible, and detailing air marshals randomly on commerical flights also are probably good moves. So, in my estimation, there have been improvements that are reasonable and effective. But the truth is what it is, like it or not: if someone really wants to sabotage an airplane, they can do it. With ease. As Bogdan Dzakovic, once a leader of a team of security investigators with the TSA, puts it, "It's worse now [compared to pre-9/11]. The terrorists can pretty much do what they want when they want to do it."¹¹ Bruce Schneier, security company executive and one-time consultant to TSA, sums the situation up this way: "Exactly two things have made airline travel safer since 9/11: reinforcement of cockpit doors, and passengers who now know that they may have to fight back. Everything else . . . is security theater."¹⁷

Frankly, the new high-tech passports and the projected national standard for driver's licenses (that is, national ID card) will do nothing but provide more personal information to government authorities without increasing security one iota. Does anyone at Homeland Security really believe that counterfeiters will be terribly challenged by some high-tech additions to identification documents or that screeners will suddenly be observant and thorough? Let us hope not. If they do, we are in worse trouble than even I think we are.²⁰

1. Wald, M. L. "Experts Assail Bag-Check System." New York Times 9 June 2002.
2. "Custom Service Lost 2,251 Computers." Associated Press 10 Oct. 2002.
3. "Security Sweep Nets 25 Airport Workers." Associated Press 11 Dec. 2002.
4. "Serious Security Questions at Sky Harbor." Phoenix, AZ 20 July 2007 <http://www.abc15.com/news/local>.
5. Neergaard, Lauran, and Devlin Barret. "How TB Patient Evaded All Authority." Associated Press 31 May 2007.
6. Sherman, Deborah. "Undercover Agents Slip Bombs Past DIA Screeners." KUSA-TV Denver, CO 29 Mar. 2007 <http://www.9news.com/news/article.aspx?storyid=67166>.
7. "Safety in the Skies." Arizona Daily Star 16 Sept. 2001.
8. Poole, Bob. "Conflict of Interest Still a Live Issue for TSA." Reason Foundation. 10 Dec. 2006 <http://www.reason.org/outofcontrol/archives/airport_security/>.
9. "Screeners at 32 of the nation's largest airports failed to detect fake weapons (guns, dynamite, bombs) in almost a quarter of the undercover tests at screening checkpoints." GAO Report quoted in USA Today 21 Jan. 2003.
10. Undercover investigators for GAO in September of 2003 found weapons were still passing through security checkpoints, but GAO classified the level of failure. CBS News. 25 Sept. 2003 <http://www.cbsnews.com>.
11. "Aviation Security Perspectives." The Boyd Group: Aviation Consulting and Forecasting. 14 Aug. 2006 <http://www.aviationplanning.com/asrc11.htm>.
12. According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were identified as possible security risks by the passenger-profiling system. Knight Ridder Washington Bureau 27 Jan. 2004.
13. "College Student Admits Planting Box Cutters on Planes." 17 Oct. 2003 CNN.COM./U.S. <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/17/suspicious.baggage/index.html>.
14. "L.A., Chicago Screeners Missed Most Fake Bombs." Arizona Republic 18 Oct. 2007 A classified report obtained by USA Today revealed that during 2006 security checkpoint screeners at airports in L.A., Chicago, and San Francisco failed tests for detecting simulated explosives or bomb parts hidden in carry-on items or under clothing 75, 60, and 20 percent of the time, respectively.
15. "Report: Border Security still too lax at legal entry points." Arizona Daily Star 6 Nov. 2007, A4.
16. A TSA administrator actually e-mailed inspectors to warn them of an upcoming security test, even describing the investigators and the methods they would likely use. "Security officers alerted to possibility of airport attack after seizures." 24 July 2007 msnbc.com http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19943138/.
17. "Airline Security a Waste of Cash". Wired. 1 Dec. 2005 http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2005/12/69712.
18. "Much to many people's surprise . . . highly enriched uranium . . . is so benign that a person can hold it in his hands and not face any ill effects until years later, if at all. It can also slip through U.S. safeguards," (Source: Laura Holgate, vice president, Nuclear Threat Initiative). Government auditors discovered that radiation detectors planned by Homeland Security to be deployed at ports of entry at a cost of $1 billion plus cannot distinguish potentially dangerous items from benign sources, such as kitty litter. "Experts: Fears about 'suitcase' nukes likely unfounded" Arizona Daily Star 11 Nov. 2007, A15.
19. "GAO: Investigators pass security at 19 airports with bomb parts". CNN.com/US. 14 Nov. 2007 http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/11/14/gao.airport.security/index.html?iref=newssearch.
20. Apparently, people at Homeland Security are naive enough to believe they can out-high-tech prospective saboteurs. See "'Real ID' needed to fly as early as May 11." Arizona Daily Star 12 January 2008, A1.
21. Williams, Pete. "TSA Chief Chides Airlines for 'Watch List' Errors". MSNBC.msn.com. 24 July 2008 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25835893.
    
    

Support for Premise 6^b

If people are willing to give up their liberty for the illusion of security (See the explanation of Premise 4^b, above.), there is not much I can say. Personally, I object to being treated as a criminal suspect and having my person and possessions searched with no reasonable justification. Each time I fly, which is extremely seldom these days, I pass through a checkpoint and then ask for the supervisor and express to him or her how much I object to being treated as I was just treated.

I am continually amazed how ready Americans are to forfeit civil liberties which have cost so many lives to secure and protect. In a recent survey by the Arizona Daily Star (20 Aug. 2007) only 10 percent of the respondents found having to remove "shoes, belts and other items at the security checkpoint" troublesome. The propaganda and indoctrination which occurs almost daily regarding security issues apparently is quite effective. The tragic outcome is that to a large degree the terrorists have already won. They've drastically curtailed both our privacy and our freedom and with our cooperation!!!

For more literate and persistent resistance to ever-more-repressive (and ridiculous) security measures, read Garrison Keillor's op-ed column "Airline Security Requires Both a Left and a Right Wing" (Arizona Daily Star. 14 Sept. 2006.), or the article about John Gilmore, an eccentric Silicon Valley millionaire who no longer is allowed to travel by bus, train, or plane. His personal Web site is http://www.toad.com/gnu/.

Support for Premise 8^b

The United States allows over 6 million children a year to die when most of their deaths could be prevented.^1,2 The budget for the TSA is more than adequate to save those children, yet billions are wasted on a charade supposedly designed to save Americans from terrorists. The United States is one of the least generous of the wealthy nations when it comes to helping people in other countries.⁴ It is best known presently as the self-righteous world bully. In 26 of 33 countries where trend statistics are available, the United States is viewed less favorably in 2007 than it was in 2002, even among European allies.³ Americans drive Hummers while people starve--and they drive them to church!

Is it any wonder the United States is viewed by hundreds of millions of people as the "Great Satan." Is it any wonder terrorists, aka "martryrs" in Islamic countries, are easy to recruit? How ironic that the very measures designed to keep Americans safe actually increase their danger. How ironic that so many in the United States insist they live in a Christian country and yet choose to ignore the needs of their fellow humans. It is at this point that "Christians" cite missions which, although generally well-intentioned, too often in fact have been and are paternalistic and condescending and exploitive. For decades Americans through corporate enterprises squeezed wealth from the world and through religious missions warned people they worshipped false gods, were sinners. It should be no surprise that resentment builds under such conditions.

The kind of naive worldview that is typical of so many Americans, the one that includes the illusion of the United States as the great giver materially and spiritually, is simply unpatriotic. It puts at grave risk the welfare of future generations of Americans.

1. "Young Child Survival and Development." UNICEF 2007 <http://www.unicef.org/childsurvival/index.html>.
2. Bryce, J., et al. "Can the World Afford to Save the Lives of 6 Million Children Each Year?" Lancet 25 June 2005 < http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?cmd=Retrieveamp;db=pubmedamp;dopt=AbstractPlus&list_uids=15978927>.
3. Pew Global Attitudes Project.
   27 June 2007 < http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256>.
   13 June 2006 < http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>.
4. Somberg, Ben. "The World's Most Generous Misers." FAIR Sept.-Oct. 2005 <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2676>. In 2005 most Americans thought 20 percent of the federal budget went to foreign aid. A 1997 poll showed that 64 percent of Americans thought foreign aid was the largest part of the federal budget. That is just how completely uninformed Americans typically are. The truth is a bit hard to take: in 2004 of the world's 22 wealthiest nations the United States was number 21 when it came to giving as a percentage of Gross National Income. Of course, there is always the maddeningly self-righteous response, "But that does not include corporate and personal giving!!!" As though only in America are corporate and personal generosity found! In 2002 the United States was 16th out of the 21 wealthiest countries in per capital government aid; add per capital private giving to the equation and the United States moves up to 15th. (Source: Center for Global Development and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in "Ranking the Rich." Foreign Affairs May/June 2004 as summarized by infoplease <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0930884.html>.) For a cynical view of these statistics try Helen Hughes' "New Foreign Aid Index Says Little about Real Support for Developing Countries." Online Opinion. <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=387>.

Explanation of Conclusion^b

Rolling back airport checkpoint security to pre-9/11 measures, adding air marshals and open and complete communication (under scrutiny to avoid egregious civil rights violations) among security agencies regarding suspicious individuals, continuing to make cockpits harder to access, and training checkpoint personnel more effectively would probably make fliers more secure and release billions to engage in the kinds of activities that are consistent with the caring talk of Americans, activities that could go a long way toward remaking the image and reclaiming the soul of America and further reducing threats to its populace. There is no need to continue diminishing freedom and privacy in the name of security.

Do random searches, x-raying bodies and shoes, and confiscating aftershave, pinking shears, and matches improve security? As I once heard a security expert admit on a NPR broadcast, such activity is fluff, for show, psychological stroking; if saboteurs and hijackers have not been identifed before they hit the checkpoints, if security personnel do not have access to watch lists and are poor profilers, checkpoints are no barrier to a terrorist boarding a plane. In fact, there are so many ways to circumvent checkpoints, why would someone up to no good even bother?

Just how dangerous is flying? Just how much of a threat is terrorism? Americans are no more likely to die flying than they are driving, even with the porous security systems.¹ According to airline security company CEO, Bruce McIndoe, the risk each year of an American dying in a terrorist attack is about 9.3 million to 1. The same statistic for dying in a car accident is approximately 18,842 to 1.² "The most dangerous part of a trip," McIndoe tells us, "is the drive to the airport."³ Maybe the United States could reassess its priorities, get realistic, even allocate additional funds to reducing DUI terrorism which accounted for 17,602 deaths in 2006.^a,4

^aWhy not stretch the definition of terrorism a little more. Everyone else is a terrorist these days!

1. Levitt, Seven D., and Stephen J. Dubner. Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything. New York: William Morrow, 2005. (p. 151)
2. "What are the Odds of Dying?" National Safety Council. 2003 <http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds.htm>.
3. USA Today. 11 March 2003, A1.
4. "Nation's DUI Deaths Fall; Arizona's Rise." Arizona Daily Star 21 Aug. 2007, A3.

Last updated July 25, 2008.

Ek Buys
ejb@phonysecurity.com